Absence and Overtime Work: Empirical Evidence from Norway by Dyrstad, Jan Morten & Ose, Solveig Osborg
WORKING PAPER SERIES  
 
 
 
 
 
No. 26/2002 
 
 
 
 
ABSENCE AND OVERTIME WORK: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM 
NORWAY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan Morten Dyrstad 
Solveig Osborg Ose 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics  
 N-7491 Trondheim, Norway 
www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/wp/wp.htm 
   ISSN 1503-299X 
Absence and overtime work:
Empirical Evidence from Norway∗
Jan Morten Dyrstad Solveig Osborg Ose
Department of Economics
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
N-7034 Trondheim, Norway
Revised version, September 1999
Abstract
This paper presents both theoretical and empirical analyses of the
relationship between overtime work and absence. Demand for absence
is analysed under the assumption that workers in a given firm can be
represented by one of two types of workers, denoted overemployed
and underemployed. Increased demand for overtime hours has a non-
positive eﬀect on absence. If actual overtime pay is higher than the
reservation wage, a higher demand for overtime hours will reduce ab-
sence. Otherwise absence is unaﬀected. On the other hand, demand
for overtime increases if absence increases. The empirical analysis is
carried out on quarterly panel data from 263 firms, covering the time
period 1990-96. The empirical results confirm the theoretical pre-
dictions except from the eﬀect of overtime hours on absence, where
positive elasticities are estimated.
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paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
Does overtime work aﬀect sickness absenteeism, and does sickness absen-
teeism aﬀect overtime work? These are the two main questions addressed
in this paper, where the aim is to uncover economic factors behind absence,
with special focus on the relation between overtime work and absence. The
paper contains theoretical models of the relationship between absence and
overtime work, and gives empirical evidence on this relationship.
The topic of the paper should be of interest for at least two main rea-
sons. First, most of the studies by economists on absenteeism are biased in
the sense that they are almost solely based on supply side models.1 A main
problem by excluding the demand side of the labour market is that interpre-
tations of empirical results are diﬃcult as they may mixture both demand
and supply side factors (Barmby and Treble, 1989). In this respect this pa-
per diﬀers from a lot of research on absenteeism as the demand and supply
sides are taken simultaneously into account. Second, it is of general interest
to obtain empirical estimates of the eﬀects on absenteeism if the amount of
overtime work changes, and vice versa. Such information is important in
relation to for instance discussions on changes in working hours. If a re-
duction in normal (contract) working hours increases overtime work, which
again increases sickness absenteeism, the expected positive welfare eﬀects of
reductions in working hours may be reduced. This is directly related to dis-
cussions of changes in rules for overtime work. The general rule in Norway
is that a worker may work until 200 hours of overtime a year, and until 300
hours if the work is approved by the shop steward. However, this rule has
come under pressure as employers wish to extend the 300 hours limit. The
employee side is against an extension, arguing that it will increase working
pressure. Empirical evidence on the relationship between sickness absen-
teeism and overtime work may thus add new arguments to the discussion of
the length of the normal working day.
The empirical analysis is carried out on firm specific data referring to
blue collar workers. In total we have quarterly data from 263 firms from the
time period 1990-1996.
1For a review of this literature, see Brown and Sessions (1996).
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The paper is organised in the following way. The next section presents
a theoretical framework which we use to analyse absence and overtime de-
cisions. The empirical model, including data and definitions of variables,
and econometric issues, are given in Section 3. Section 4 gives the empirical
results. A summary of the main findings is given in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section the relationship between absence and overtime hours is dis-
cussed within a standard framework of firm level labour supply and demand.
We assume that absence decisions are taken by two types of representative
employees but the firm may directly aﬀect the decisions by demanding over-
time hours at exogenously given rates of overtime pay. Indirectly the firm
may aﬀect absence if for instance overtime hours increase workers’ tiredness
so they need more hours absent to recover, or in general become more ex-
posed to sickness with a lot of overtime work. Demand for overtime hours
is outlined from a representative cost minimizing firm which may choose be-
tween normal (contract) working hours and overtime hours in order to satisfy
a given level of production. The stock of capital is assumed fixed, given from
the firm’s long run optimization.
2.1 Absence
The basic model in this section is commonly used in absence research,2 but
the model is extended to discuss overtime work. This extension is to some
degree based on Leslie (1982).
A fundamental assumption for this analysis is that workers in a given rep-
resentative firm can be represented by one of two types of workers, denoted
overemployed (oe) and underemployed (ue) workers. The working contracts
are similar for both types of workers, and specify a fixed number of normal
hours, HC , each worker has to work during a specified period of time. The
diﬀerence between these two groups is that the ue-worker is rationed with
respect to working time, i.e., (s)he wishes to work more than the specified
number of normal hours, while the oe-worker wishes to work less than HC .
We assume that the firm demands overtime hours to which the workers re-
spond voluntarily. Furthermore, it is assumed that conditions securing that
2See for instance ibid. and Dyrstad and Lysø (1998).
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there is always excess supply of overtime work are met, and that those work-
ing overtime are hired randomly but they choose the length of overtime by
themselves. The utility function of both types of workers is given by
V i = V i(Ci, Li;Si, Z), i = oe, ue, (1)
where Ci and Li denote consumption and leisure, respectively. Si is an index
of sickness taking values between 0 and 1. The case Si = 0 indicates that
the worker is healthy and able to work eﬃciently, while Si = 1 indicates
that (s)he is completely unable to work. As mentioned above, both types
of workers are employed in the same representative firm, so Z is a vector
of variables describing working conditions in this firm. Higher values of
Z indicate that working conditions worsen. The standard assumption of a
strictly quasi-concave utility function is imposed.
The budget restriction for an underemployed worker is3
C =WC [HC − (1− k)HA] +WOHO + F − P (HA, U) (2)
The variables WC and WO are the real disposable wage rates for normal
hours (HC) and overtime hours (HO), respectively. HA is number of hours
absent from work, k is degree of economic compensation if absent from work,
and F is non-labour income. If k = 1 the worker is fully compensated,
while k = 0 implies no compensation. Non-labour income may range from
dividends to disablement benefits.
The penalty function P (HA, U), which depends on individual absence
and the rate of unemployment, U , is included because absence represents
costs to the firm. A cost minimizing firm will try to reduce absence, and
may for instance do so by holding out expectations of reduced fringe ben-
efits and career opportunities if absence is high. Also, a higher probabil-
ity of dismissal if the firm has to reduce employment may be important.
As penalty in terms of reduced income depends on labour market con-
ditions, penalty is higher when unemployment is high, also at the mar-
gin. We therefore assume that penalty is increasing and convex in HA,
i.e., ∂P/∂HA = P 0 > 0, ∂2P/(∂HA)2 = P 00 > 0, and that P (0, U) = 0,
∂P/∂U > 0 and ∂2P/∂HA∂U > 0.4
3Subscript ue is dropped to simplify. We have also dropped subscripts in the following
for the same reason.
4As long as ∂2P/∂HA∂U is non-negative, unambiguous eﬀects of changes in the rate
of unemployment are obtained from this model.
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More leisure than what follows from working normal hours, LC , is only
possible if HA > 0, which implies L = LC +HA. Letting total available time
be denoted T , the individual time restriction for a ue-worker can be written
as
L = T −HC −HO +HA (3)
From this setup we have the following four possible cases to analyse:
i) overemployed and not allowed to work overtime
ii) overemployed and allowed to work overtime
iii) underemployed and not allowed to work overtime
iv) underemployed and allowed to work overtime
Which of these cases we analyse aﬀects the budget restrictions (2) and
(3). In cases i)-iii) HO = 0, i.e., HO drops out of the budget restrictions
and the representative worker maximizes utility function (1) w.r.t. C and
HA. In case iv) HA = 0, implying that the representative worker maximizes
utility by choosing C and HO. In the following we look at cases i)-iii) and
iv) separately, and throughout we assume interior solutions.5
2.1.1 Overemployed and underemployed but not allowed to work
overtime [cases i)-iii)]
Maximizing utility function (1) w.r.t. HA and C, subject to the budget
restrictions (2) and (3) with HO = 0, gives the same marginal conditions for
cases i)-iii), i.e.,
VL
VC
=WC(1− k) + P 0, (4)
5Even if k = 1, this is not a particularly restrictive assumption. In this case the budget
restriction is flat close to HA = 0, which is due to the assumption P (0, U) = 0. So if the
representative worker chooses HA = 0, this implies that the indiﬀerence curve is also flat.
It is diﬃcult to see why contract hours in the economy, HC , is chosen so low that the
indiﬀerence curve of the representative worker is flat. In Norway k has been equal to 1
during our estimation period 1990-1996.
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where VL = ∂V/∂L and VC = ∂V/∂C. Equation (4) has the standard in-
terpretation that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and con-
sumption equals the price of leisure, which is also the price of being absent
from work. For all these three cases the relevant budget line is B0-B1in Fig-
ure 1. The optimal choice of consumption and absence in cases i) and ii) is
illustrated by point A in Figure 1. Point B in Figure 1 gives the optimal
choice for the rationed worker [case iii)]. From the first order conditions of
this maximisation problem the absence relation corresponding to these three
cases may be expressed as
HA = f0(W
C , k, U, S, Z,HC , F ) (5)
 
WC
B0
  
WO
WO*
U1ue
U0ue
U0oe
B1
F
A
B
C
C
44 344 21                      876         44 344 21                          
4444444 34444444 21                                                                 HOue
HAue
HAoe
HC
B2
Figure 1: The absence decision
2.1.2 Underemployed and allowed to work overtime [case iv)]
In this case all types of workers are allowed to work overtime, but choosing
HO > 0 is only relevant for the ue-worker. If overtime pay is higher than
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WO∗, this worker will choose HO > 0 (and HA = 0), as illustrated by
point C in Figure 1. The reservation rate of overtime pay, WO∗, is given
by indiﬀerence between working overtime and being absent from work. The
corresponding first order condition is
VL
VC
=WO, (6)
saying that the price of leisure is the rate of overtime pay. If overtime pay
is not suﬃciently high (WO < WO∗), we get the same solution as given by
equation (4). Thus the variables aﬀecting absence in cases i)-iii) may also
aﬀect the ue-worker ’s absence decision. The general absence relation for this
type of worker could therefore be formulated as equation (5) augmented by
HO and WO.
2.1.3 Aggregate absence and comparative statics
Based on the analyses in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 we may now formulate an
aggregate absence relation as:6
HTA = f(WC , k, U, S, Z,HC , F,HTO,WO), (7)
where HTA denotes total absence. In line with the analysis in the preceding
section, demand for total overtime work (HTO) and overtime pay (WO) are
included in equation (7) to capture that some workers are underemployed
and rationed. However, changes in HTO and WO will only aﬀect aggregate
absence if there is a suﬃciently large number of workers with reservation
rates of overtime pay higher than the actual rate. This assumption implies
that there is always excess supply of overtime work. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that those who supply overtime work are hired randomly, and that
each worker choose by their own how much overtime to work. Under these
assumptions we get the following eﬀects on aggregate absence of changes in
HTO and WO.
Increased demand for overtime work reduces absence because there are
always some workers who - by assumption - are rationed and willing to switch
from being absent to work overtime, i.e., ∂HTA/∂HO < 0. By the same way
of reasoning, if the rate of overtime pay increases, some workers who have
6As explained in the preceding section, the absence relation for the ue-worker could be
fomulated in a similar way.
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chosen to be absent because overtime pay is lower than (or equal to) their
critical rates, will switch from absence to overtime work. Consequently, the
eﬀect on aggregate absence will be negative, and in the following we also refer
to this eﬀect as a substitution eﬀect.7 For those who have already chosen to
work overtime before an increase in overtime pay, an increase inWO will not
aﬀect absence, so the result ∂HTA/∂WO < 0 is still valid.8
If the actual rate of overtime pay for all workers is lower than their reser-
vation rates, it follows that changes in HTO and WO will not aﬀect absence.
We therefore conclude that more overtime work has a non-increasing eﬀect
on aggregate absence, while the eﬀect of a higher rate of overtime pay is
ambiguous.
Turning to the other variables in equation (7), we first look at changes in
the contract wage (WC). If all workers are overemployed or rationed, the sign
of ∂HTA/∂WC is in general ambiguous. This is due to the assumption that
leisure (absence) and consumption are normal goods, and the mechanisms
are the same as for a change inWO discussed above: The substitution eﬀects
reduce demand for absence because it becomes more expensive. The income
eﬀects go in the opposite direction, because a higher wage rate gives higher
budgets.
A change in the contract wage rate may also aﬀect demand for absence for
non-rationed underemployed workers: If WC increases, the relevant budget
lines9 will shift positively and parallel. This induces income eﬀects which will
reduce overtime work, and for some workers possibly to such an extent that
they switch from working overtime to demanding absence. But because the
eﬀect of a higher contract wage is ambiguous for overemployed and rationed
workers, we are still not able to sign ∂HTA/∂WC unambiguously.
The normality assumption gives unambiguous predictions of changes in
degree of economic compensation (k) and unemployment (U). For overem-
ployed and rationed workers, increased k means that absence becomes less
7The signs of ∂HTA/∂HO and ∂HTA/∂WO will be the same if we reason on reductions
in demand for overtime work and overtime pay.
8The eﬀect on the amount of overtime work these workers want to work is ambigu-
ous, because we in this case have substitution and income eﬀects operating in opposite
directions: A higher rate of overtime pay will partially increase supply of overtime work
as the substitution eﬀect makes leisure more expensive. On the other hand, a higher rate
of overtime pay increases the workers’ budget, so the income eﬀect goes in the opposite
direction. The total eﬀect on overtime work is therefore ambiguous.
9These budget lines correspond to B1-B2 in Figure 1.
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expensive at the margin but also that the budgets increase, so in this case
both the substitution and income eﬀects contribute to more absence. A
higher rate of unemployment gives reduced expected income through the
penalty function. Thus the eﬀect on absence is opposite to higher economic
compensation, i.e., ∂HTA/∂U < 0. We denote this unemployment eﬀect as
a discipline eﬀect. However, only changes in economic compensation may
aﬀect the overtime/absence decisions of non-rationed underemployed work-
ers.10 The reason is that a higher k will increase the budgets and reduce
steepness of the budget lines,11 so that some of these workers may switch to
positive absence demand, thus increasing aggregate absence. The total eﬀect
is therefore still unambiguously positive, i.e., ∂HTA/∂k > 0.
Concerning the other variables, additional assumptions have to be im-
posed on the utility function to obtain unambiguous predictions. These
predictions and corresponding assumptions will be discussed briefly in the
following.12
Imposing the reasonable assumptions that marginal utility of leisure is
non-decreasing in sickness (S), and that marginal utility of consumption is
non-increasing in sickness, a higher degree of sickness gives more absence
among overemployed and rationed workers. Graphically this means that
the indiﬀerence curves become steeper when S increases. The same applies
to deteriorating working conditions, i.e., ∂HTA/∂Z > 0. For non-rationed
underemployed workers it is not possible to get opposite eﬀects, because
higher rates of substitution between leisure and consumption may eventually
switch some of these workers from overtime work to demanding absence.
Changes in normal hours (HC) have in general ambiguous eﬀects on ab-
sence for overemployed and rationed workers. However, if marginal utility of
leisure is non-decreasing in consumption, an increase in HCwill unambigu-
ously increase absence. The eﬀect is also unambiguously positive if there is
full economic compensation (k = 1) and no penalty [P (HA, U) = 0]. In the
case of non-rationed underemployed workers an increase in normal hours may
increase absence through negative parallel shifts in the budget lines (income
eﬀects): Referring to Figure 1, an increase in HC shifts point B1 north-west
10A higher rate of unemployment will reduce expected income and make the budget
lines steeper. Thus it is not possible that non-rationed underemployed workers will switch
from overtime work to demanding absence.
11These budget lines correspond to B0-B1 in Figure 1.
12Formally outlined comparative static results, both of these and those presented above,
can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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along the ray from point F with angel wC . Workers with high rates of sub-
stitution between leisure and consumption may therefore get higher levels of
utility by switching from overtime work to absence.
Throughout this section we have assumed that leisure and consumption
are normal goods. In the case of non-rationed underemployed workers an in-
crease in non-labour income (F ) may increase absence. The reason is that an
increase in F creates both income and substitution eﬀects for overemployed
and rationed workers, but only income eﬀects in the case of non-rationed
underemployed workers. For non-rationed underemployed workers the mech-
anism is similar to an increase in contract wages, explained above.
2.2 Demand for overtime hours
Demand for overtime hours is analysed under the assumption that the firm’s
stock of capital is fixed, so this is a short run analysis. The number of actual
working hours per employee, H, is given by
H = HC −HA +HO (8)
An important assumption in the following analysis is that an increasing
amount of overtime hours relative to employment (normal working hours)
yields a less eﬃcient way of organizing production, and vice versa. This
is a reasonable assumption because such work as clearing of factory halls,
repairing and maintenance of machines are more eﬃciently done after the
end of the normal working day.13 On the other hand, if a large part of work
has to be done after the end of normal working time eﬃciency is lowered, e.g.,
because other firms are closed. This assumption is captured by the relation
H∗ = g(NHC , HTO), (9)
where H∗ is total number of hours necessary to satisfy a chosen level of
production, and g(.) is a strictly quasi-concave function. Since HC is exoge-
nously given, the firm’s choice of number of employees (N) and total overtime
hours (HTO) is restricted by (9).
For given total hours of absence (HTA), total costs are given by
K =WCHCN −WC(1− k + d)HTA +WOHTO +K0, (10)
13By ”normal working day” we mean work within the spcified number of contract hours.
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where d is the fraction of economic compensation not paid by the firm,14 and
K0 is fixed costs.
Minimising total costs w.r.t. HTO and N given restriction (9), and taking
(8) into account, yields the first order condition
−dNH
C
dHTO
=
gHTO
gNHC
=
WO
WC
, (11)
where gHTO = ∂g/∂HTO and gNHC = ∂g/∂NHC . This condition states that
the firm should combine HTO and NHC so that the relative productivity of
these two types of work equals relative costs. The solution is illustrated by
point A in Figure 2.
B
C
C B
g(NHC, HTO)=H*
HTO
NHC
NHC
B
C
A
∆HTA
(1+∆HC)N
HTO
Figure 2: Demand for overtime hours
14For instance paid by National Insurance, to which employees also contribute.
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The rate of overtime pay, WO, is higher than the rate for normal working
hours, WC , so WO/WC > 1. Consequently, to obtain an interior solution
to the cost minimising problem the slope of the contours of g(.) has to be
suﬃciently smaller than −1 for low levels of HTO. Otherwise the firm would
use only normal working hours. But as mentioned above, it is not unrealistic
to argue that some work is much more eﬃciently done after the end of the
normal working day, implying a slope smaller than −1.
Within this short run set-up, the eﬀect on overtime hours if absence
increases is positive. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where an increase in
absence by ∆HTA gives solution B, and a corresponding iso-cost line B-B. It
also follows directly from Figure 2 that an increase in normal hours by ∆HC
reduces demand for overtime hours, corresponding to point C and iso-cost line
C-C.15 Higher overtime pay increases steepness of the iso-cost lines, implying
that demand for overtime hours will be reduced. The opposite applies if the
contract wage increases. Assuming that both normal and overtime work are
normal factors of production, an increase in H∗ will increase HO. On this
background, a general relation for overtime hours can be written as
HTO = h(WO,WC ,HTA,HC ;H∗) (12)
3 Data and Empirical Modeling
The aim of this section is twofold. First, in section 3.1, we describe and dis-
cuss some features of the data which we use in the econometric analyses. We
focus on main variables, and particularly relate the presentation to gender
diﬀerences and diﬀerences w.r.t. the industries included in our sample. Sec-
ondly, in section 3.2, the econometric model is presented and issues related
to the empirical modelling are discussed.
We use panel data from 263 firms covering the time span 1990-96 (7
years). Data on absence, overtime work, wages and employment refer to
blue collar workers, and for most of these firms we have separate observa-
tions for both women and men in each firm. In 131 firms only data for one of
the groups are available, due to incomplete reporting from the other group.
In the other 132 firms we have data for both women and men. Thus we
have (132x2+131=) 395 cross-sections, which with quarterly observations in
15In these two cases the firm is no longer optimally adjusted, i.e., the iso-cost line is not
tangent to the contour of g(.) = H∗.
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total give 11,060 observations. This is therefore a balanced panel dataset.
The firms are selected into this panel if they have continually been report-
ing absence data to the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry
(NHO) in the time period 1990-96. Hence, to the extent that our empirical
results are generalized to the whole population of firms one should be aware
of selection biases.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Two tables will be presented in this section. Unweighted means and coeﬃ-
cients of variation (CV)16 of absence rates, overtime hours, wages, employ-
ment and rates of unemployment for each of the years 1990-96 are given in
Table 1. Separate calculations for men and women are presented. In Table
2 we present unweighted means and coeﬃcients of variation of the absence
rates and overtime hours by industry. As the specification of the economet-
ric model in section 3.2 will show, we use total number of absence days and
overtime hours in each firm in the econometric analysis, while we in Table 1
and 2 use absence days and overtime hours per employee.
About 63% of the cross-section units refer to male workers. On average
each firm in our dataset employs 135 male and 44 female workers, which il-
lustrates that the industries represented are traditionally dominated by male
workers. Measured by employment, iron and metal is the largest industry in
the sample (See Table 2). Those employed in the iron and metal industry do
heavy physical work, so it is not surprising that only 30% of the cross-sections
in this industry refer to women. On average there are 33 female and 186 male
workers per firm. Another large industry in the sample is food products, bev-
erages and tobacco, but in this industry 56% of the cross-section units are
women. However, on average the industry has about 113 male workers and
76 female workers in each firm.
From Table 1 it is seen that we are using two categories of absence. Short
term absence (STA) is defined as spells of absence due to sickness lasting
until 3 days plus absence registered as shirking, whereas long term absence
(LTA) is spells of absence due to sickness lasting 4 days or more.
Absence is generally higher among women than among men. On average
the rate of LTA for women is about 50% higher than for men. However, the
16The coeﬃcient of variation is defined as a variable’s standard deviation divided by it’s
mean.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Absence, Overtime Hours, Unemployment,
Pay and Employment, by Gender
Variable
1990
mean
CV
1991
mean
CV
1992
mean
CV
1993
mean
CV
1994
mean
CV
1995
mean
CV
1996
mean
CV
Total
balanced
sample
mean
CV
Total
NHO
sample
mean
CV
Rate of LTA 3.80 3.65 3.41 3.22 2.98 3.17 3.41 3.38 3.27
men 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.78 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.83
Rate of LTA 6.02 5.46 4.87 4.50 4.48 4.79 5.52 5.09 5.04
women 0.72 0.71 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.78 1.09
Rate of STA 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.66
men 0.56 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.68
Rate of STA 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.76 0.71 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.73
women 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.72 0.64 0.70 0.89 0.73 0.99
Overtime hours per 20.29 20.22 21.27 21.95 24.84 25.00 29.68 23.32 21.54
employee, men 0.82 1.00 1.60 1.50 1.97 2.01 3.28 2.14 1.83
Overtime hours per 9.75 10.13 9.60 10.05 12.05 11.99 11.85 10.77 10.20
employee, women 1.50 1.40 1.48 1.60 1.75 1.94 1.67 1.67 1.62
Rate of unemployment 4.08 4.44 4.97 5.18 4.57 4.06 3.57 4.41 4.43
men 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.32
Rate of unemployment 2.62 2.80 3.14 3.28 3.27 3.26 2.98 3.05 3.03
women 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.32
Overtime premium 57.07 59.63 62.70 63.96 66.76 70.37 72.83 64.76 63.91
men 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.41
Overtime premium 52.49 57.09 58.38 61.32 62.27 65.46 67.20 60.60 61.21
women 0.46 0.76 0.40 0.52 0.42 0.39 0.34 0.48 0.71
Normal wage rate 82.10 86.10 88.47 90.58 93.32 95.90 99.67 90.88 90.22
men 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14
Normal wage rate 77.89 82.06 84.66 87.07 89.43 92.13 95.43 86.95 85.62
women 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.14
Number of workers 141.78 138.20 134.23 132.54 131.90 133.42 133.71 135.11 104.63
men 1.46 1.50 1.54 1.56 1.52 1.49 1.47 1.50 1.64
Number of workers 49.58 46.08 44.63 43.17 41.87 40.77 40.96 43.87 30.76
women 1.32 1.29 1.28 1.26 1.20 1.19 1.16 1.25 1.48
Notes: Rates of short (STA) and long term absence (LTA) are given by total absence days per employee
per quarter. Rates of unemployment are given by number of persons registered as unemployed in per cent
of the working force in each municipality. Overtime is defined as number of overtime hours worked per
employee per quarter. The overtime premium is additional nominal earnings per hour of overtime work and
normal wage rate is nominal hourly earnings for work within normal working day. Number of workers is
number of persons working in the firm per quarter.
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corresponding diﬀerence for STA is only 7%. There are several explanations
to these diﬀerences, e.g., pregnancies and child care. In physically demanding
industries, diﬀerences in physical constitution between men and women could
also be an important factor.
The lowest means are observed in 1994 for both STA and LTA (women
and men). For STA the rates stay rather constant, varying in the intervals
0.67-0.73 (men) and 0.71-0.82 (women). On the other hand, there is more
variation in the rates of LTA. The two highest observed means (in 1990) are
about 22-25% higher than the means in 1994. There is also a clear pattern
of falling LTA-rates until 1994, but from then on they increase. Concerning
variation between the firms, the changes seem too small and not systematic
w.r.t. time.
We define overtime work in Table 1 as number of overtime hours worked
per worker. A striking but not surprising feature concerning overtime work
is that men on average work more than twice as much overtime as women.
It is reasonable that more household work and child care among women may
explain this diﬀerence. Overtime work is relatively stable for both women
and men from 1990 to 1993. From 1993 to 1994 the increase was 13% for
men and 20% for women. For men there was also a sharp increase from 1995
to 1996 (19%), whereas overtime work among women stayed relatively stable
after 1994.
Both absence and overtime work have break points around 1993/94, as
is also the case for the rates of unemployment.17 Both male and female un-
employment rates increased gradually and approximately equally from 1990
to the peak in 1993. Unemployment among men increased by 27%, while
the female rate of unemployment increased by 25% in this period. However,
the drops in unemployment after 1993 diﬀer between women and men. From
1993 to 1996 the male rate of unemployment is reduced by 31% but only by
9% for women.
It is not unreasonable that unemployment aﬀects absence and overtime
work. In the period of increasing unemployment (1990-93) we see from Table
1 that LTA is reduced but increases in the period of decreasing unemploy-
ment (1993-96), indicating an inverse relationship between unemployment
and absence. Overtime work increases slightly during the period of increas-
17We use municipality specific rates of unemployment, so the unemployment variation
is due both to diﬀerences between municipalities and between the quarters in the given
year.
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ing unemployment. During the period of decreasing unemployment overtime
work increases more, particularly among men. A possible explanation to
this picture is that firms during a recession substitute hiring of additional
workers with more overtime due to uncertainty about the future. Hence, the
relatively sharp increase in overtime work in the recovering period has to
be explained by recruiting problems because the labour market tightens. In
relation to this it is interesting to note that there is an increase over time
in the variation between firms regarding overtime work, which may indicate
diﬀerences regarding recruiting possibilities and uncertainty.
Two wage variables are important in this paper, in Table 1 denoted over-
time premium and normal wage rate. The overtime premium is additional
average nominal earnings per hour of overtime work, and the normal wage
rate is nominal hourly earnings for work within the normal working day.
These wage variables are the same as the ones used in the econometric anal-
yses, except that they are deflated by consumer prices. For the period 1990-
96, the average overtime premia are approximately NOK 65 and NOK 61 for
men and women, respectively. This diﬀerence between women and men may
reflect that men work more overtime hours than women and/or that men of-
ten are more able to work during hours with high overtime pay, for instance
late nights and long hours. The overtime premia increased by 28% for both
women and men during this period, while normal wage rates increased by
21% for male workers and 22.5% for female workers from 1990 to 1996. From
Table 1 we see that the variation between firms regarding normal wage rates
is very stable. Due to the changes in overtime work mentioned above it is
not surprising that there is more variation in overtime premia.
Number of workers is the last variable in Table 1, and as already men-
tioned, on average there are 135 male and 44 female workers in each firm in
our sample in this period.
The last column in Table 1 (Total NHO sample) shows averages of the
variables for the period 1990-96 if we use the total NHO sample, and not
only the balanced panel which we are using in this paper. The total NHO
sample referred to in Table 1 is a representative sample of the firms which are
members of NHO. Dyrstad and Skramstad (1998) find that the development
in employment in all NHO firms and the total population of firms in eleven
main industries from National Accounting is very similar over the time period
1970-1996. This is an indication that the total NHO sample is representative.
It is therefore interesting to note that averages of the variables in Table 1
are very similar in the total balanced sample (second last column in Table
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1) and the total NHO sample. The only exception is employment, where the
averages from the total balanced sample are higher than the averages from
the total NHO sample, indicating that large firms are overrepresented in the
sample which we are using18. However, the ratio between women and men is
exactly the same.
Table 2 gives means and coeﬃcients of variation (CV) of absence and
overtime hours by industries. The first column shows the distribution of
industries in the sample. Iron and metal counts for more than 20% of the
sample closely followed by food products, beverage and tobacco. The petro-
chemical industry is only represented by one firm, and data for both women
and men are reported for this firm. Also transport is represented by only
one firm, and here only data for men are available because of missing data
for women. Textile and clothing, chemicals and chemical products, electro-
chemicals, and building and construction are each reported by 10% of the
sample. The distribution of industries in the total NHO sample is given in
the second column, and we see that the distributions are very similar in the
two samples.
Both the rates of LTA and STA show that there are important diﬀerences
between the industries regarding absence. On average (both women and
men) the rate of LTA is 4.1 and the rate of STA 0.75. Both STA and
LTA are highest in mining, quarrying and oil extraction, and food products,
beverages and tobacco. LTA is also high in production of pulp, paper and
paper products. Petrochemicals and transport have the lowest rates of LTA,
but one have to keep in mind that only one firm in each of these two industries
is included in the sample. Except from these two industries, building and
construction, and publishing and printing have the lowest rates of LTA. These
two industries also have the lowest rates of STA.
Concerning overtime work there is also a lot of variation between in-
dustries. In transport the average number of overtime hours per worker is
nearly 45. It is reasonable that this is an industry with a large number of
overtime hours but again it should be remembered that this figure refers to
only one firm. Otherwise, workers in iron and metal, petrochemicals, and
food products, beverages and tobacco work a lot of overtime. We calculate
the lowest number of overtime hours in textiles and clothing, and wood and
wood products.
18This is not strange as large firms often have better routines on reporting data than
smaller firms which may not have special staﬀ or divisions for these tasks.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Industry Diﬀerences
Industry
% of Total
balanced
sample
% of Total
NHO
sample
Rates of
LTA
Mean
CV
Rates of
STA
Mean
CV
Overtime
hours
Mean
CV
Mining, quarrying and oil extraction 1.56 1.22 5.03 0.89 16.12
0.72 0.56 0.71
Food products, beverages and 19.96 24.51 4.53 0.83 22.47
taobacco 0.65 0.61 1.18
Textiles and clothing 10.19 7.42 3.76 0.63 10.48
0.93 0.81 1.15
Wood and wood products 4.56 7.10 3.57 0.69 12.58
1.06 0.76 0.74
Pulp, paper and paper products 6.84 6.12 4.84 0.65 17.25
0.68 0.52 0.75
Publishing and printing 2.78 2.93 3.46 0.52 14.29
0.89 0.70 0.80
Chemicals and chemical products 9.81 8.54 4.25 0.77 13.00
0.76 0.55 0.96
Non-metallic mineral production 4.75 4.43 4.30 0.70 15.15
0.91 0.64 0.91
Electrochemicals 8.67 6.42 3.87 0.69 15.37
0.71 0.55 0.72
Petrochemicals 0.51 0.23 1.63 0.49 22.81
0.65 0.37 0.72
Iron and metal 20.76 21.74 3.66 0.76 28.58
0.80 0.62 2.93
Building and construction work 9.37 8.52 3.44 0.60 13.24
0.94 0.67 0.97
Transport 0.25 0.44 2.72 0.94 44.46
0.53 0.39 0.36
Total mean of industries 4.10 0.75 19.89
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3.2 Empirical Modeling
The empirical analysis is based on the following error correction model:
hTAijst = αi0 + αi1hTAijst−1 + αi2wNjst + αi3wOjst + αi4umst (13)
+ αi5njst + αi6hTOjst + dummies+ error term
hTOjst = β0 + β1hTOjst−1 + β2wNjst + β3wOjst + β4umst (14)
+ β5hTA3jst + β6hTA4jst + β7njst + dummies+ error term
Subscript i refers to duration of absence spells, with duration divided into
the two categories mentioned in the preceding section: i=3 refers to absence
spells lasting until 3 days plus absence registered as shirking, while i=4 refers
to sickness spells lasting 4 days or more. As in Section 3.1, the first category
will be referred to as short term absence (STA) and the second as long term
absence (LTA).19 Subscript j is the firm index, and s and t refer to gender
and time, respectively.
The variables in equations (13) and (14) are defined as follows:
hTAijst :Total number of days of absence, log-transformed. Source: Confeder-
ation of Norwegian Business and Industry.
wNjst :Average wage rate for normal working hours deflated by the national
consumer price index. The average wage rate is defined as total earnings
from work within the normal working day divided by the total number
of normal working hours, log-transformed. Source: Confederation of
Norwegian Business and Industry and Statistics Norway.
wOjst :Average overtime premium deflated by the national consumer price
index, log-transformed. Overtime premium is pay in excess of the nor-
mal wage rate due to overtime work, which is calculated by dividing
total overtime allowances by total number of overtime hours. Source:
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry and Statistics Nor-
way.
19But now we are using total number of absence days, not rates of absence.
18
umst :Aggregate municipality and gender specific unemployment rate, log-
transformed, where m refers to municipality. Source: Statistics Nor-
way.
njst :Number of workers, log-transformed. Source: Confederation of Nor-
wegian Business and Industry.
hTOjst :Total number of overtime hours worked, log-transformed. Source:
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry.
The term dummies both in equation (13) and (14) comprises one dummy
for gender (taking the value 1 if referring to men, otherwise 0), one set
of time dummies each corresponding to the years 1990-1995, and one
set of seasonal dummies (quarters).
Comparing the empirical and theoretical models, we see that they diﬀer
w.r.t. right hand side variables. Variables measuring degree of economic com-
pensation (k), sickness (S), working conditions (Z), normal working hours
(HC), non-labour income (F ) and production level (H∗) are not included in
the empirical model. The reason for this is partly that it is not possible to
obtain data corresponding to our units of observation, and partly because
there have not been any changes in some of these variables. For instance,
normal working hours have stayed constant in the period 1990-96. There
have been some changes in degree of economic compensation in the estima-
tion period, and possible eﬀects of these changes are assumed to be captured
by the time dummies. To this it should also be added that the seasonal
dummies may represent important external factors aﬀecting sickness, and
consequently sickness absenteeism: During winter time there is more flu and
respiratory related sickness. Finally, overtime hours in the absence relation
may not only be interpreted as a pure demand factor as in the theoretical
model. Overtime hours may also capture working pressure, so more overtime
hours increases absence.20
The rate of unemployment is included in equation (14) to pick up possible
eﬀects mentioned in connection to Table 1. It is obvious that large firms have
more days of absence and more overtime hours than small firms. We control
for this by including employment in both equations.
20Future projects involve collecting data on changes in working conditions at the firm
level so it becomes possible to analyse empirically to what extent working conditions may
aﬀect sickness absenteeism.
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The model consists of three equations; two absence relations correspond-
ing to short and long term absence, and one equation for overtime. The pa-
rameters in these equations are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS),
and the fixed eﬀects (FE) and random eﬀects (RE) estimators are also ap-
plied. To discriminate between the OLS and FE versions of the model we
have used standard F tests. Based on Leamer’s (1978) critical values for
these tests we cannot reject none of the OLS versions which have been esti-
mated.21 Testing the RE versions against FE the Hausman tests reject the
RE models. From this sequence it follows that the modeling should be based
on the OLS estimator.
The FE results are given in Appendix 1. Explanatory power is higher
in these models than the OLS models (See Tables 3 and 4), but absence
and overtime work in the FE models are mainly explained by the varying
intercepts and the time dummies. Most of the economically interpretable
variables are statistically not diﬀerent from zero. The firms in our sample
are all members of NHO, and it is reasonable to assume that all these firms
are covered - directly and indirectly - by central and local tariﬀ agreements
which first and foremost regulate pay for diﬀerent forms of work. This system
of tariﬀ agreements creates work and pay structures which seem stable over
time, c.f. the discussion of wages and overtime work related to Table 1. On
this background it is not surprising that the OLS models are not rejected
against the FE models, because main parts of this structure is captured by
the varying intercepts.
In order to apply the OLS, FE and RE estimators all the right hand
side variables have to be exogenous, which they are not according to the
theoretical model. The equations are therefore estimated by the instrumen-
tal variables method (IV). The parameters in the absence equations are both
overidentified, while the parameters of the overtime relation are exactly iden-
tified. However, overidentifying restrictions are imposed on all three equa-
tions, and the Sargan tests22 of overidentifying restrictions cannot reject the
null hypotheses of valid instruments. In the STA and LTA equations we
use ∆hTOt−1 and h
TO
t−1 as instruments.
23 The variables ∆hTA3t−1, h
TA
3t−1, ∆h
TA
4t−1
21By conventional critical values the OLS models are rejected. The reason for using
Learmer’s critical values is that the null hypothesis is too often rejected when the sample
size is large. Leamer’s critical values are implemented in the TSP version 4.4, which has
been used when estimating til OLS, RE and FE models.
22Sargan (1988).
23∆ denotes first diﬀerence.
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and hTA4t−1 are instruments in the overtime relation.
24 The next section gives
the OLS and IV estimates, and there are only minor diﬀerences between
these two sets of estimators. Hence, the sequence for model selection seems
consistent.
4 Empirical Results
Parameter estimates of the absence relations are given in Table 3. In addition
to the full sample OLS and IV versions, we have also estimated the models on
sub-samples. All these models explain about 50% of the variation in absence,
and the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate no first order serial correlation in
the error terms. The reported t-values are based on heteroskedastic consis-
tent standard errors (White, 1980). The estimated parameters of the lagged
endogenous variables indicate short periods of adjustment, which correspond
to rather small diﬀerences between short and long run estimates. In the
following we first comment on the full sample results.
Before turning to the parameters which are most directly related to the
topic of this paper, we note that absence among women is estimated to be
significantly higher as compared to men. Absence during winter time (first
and fourth quarter) is significantly higher than during summer time (second
and third quarter), which is according to expectations. The year dummies
aﬀect absence statistically more significant in the IV version than the OLS
version of the STA equation, but the parameter estimates are very similar in
both versions. Concerning LTA both levels of significance and estimates are
similar.
The estimated unemployment elasticities are small and highly insignifi-
cant. Dyrstad and Lysø (1998), using aggregate time series data from the
period 1970-96, estimate long run unemployment elasticities close to -0.2 for
short term absence, and close to -0.05 for long term absence. If we estimate
the models without year dummies and/or quarter dummies the unemploy-
ment elasticities become larger in absolute value and also much more signifi-
cant. Except from the unemployment elasticity, the other parameters are not
aﬀected at all.25 Concerning STA, the unemployment elasticity is close to
24The IV versions of the model are estimated by the GMM estimator implemented in
DPD (GAUSS), see Arrelano and Bond (1998).
25Only the elasticity w.r.t. wNjst is aﬀected, and varies betweeen -0.36 and -0.45.
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-0.1 if we exclude both sets of time dummies or the quarter dummies.26 For
LTA the unemployment elasticities are in the interval -0.15 - -0.09. These
estimates diﬀer from those obtained by Dyrstad and Lysø, as the eﬀect on
STA is smaller than they estimate, while the eﬀect on LTA is larger. From
this it is clear that the small and insignificant unemployment elasticities in
the OLS and IV versions presented in Table 3 are due to the inclusion of
time dummies.
The estimated elasticities w.r.t. firm specific employment are larger than
one, saying that an increase in employment by one per cent increases the
number of days absent from work relatively more.27 These results may sim-
ply be interpreted as firm size eﬀects, i.e., large firms have relatively more
absence than smaller firms. However, as the elasticities are greater than one
this could be interpreted as composition eﬀects; when number of employees
increases firms hire more and more ”marginal” labour so that absence in-
creases more than proportionally. It is interesting to note that this eﬀect is
stronger for STA than LTA.
Higher wages, both higher normal wage rates (wNjst) and overtime premia
(wOjst) are significantly negative in the STA relation. The elasticity w.r.t. the
normal wage rate is also significantly negative in the LTA relation. According
to the theoretical model these results should be interpreted as dominating
substitution eﬀects. Looking only at the elasticity w.r.t. normal wages, it
seems as the substitution eﬀects are stronger for long term than for short
term absence.28 However, the diﬀerences are not statistically diﬀerent
These results could alternatively be interpreted as composition eﬀects.
We are using firm specific data, and if low-wage firms attract the least pro-
ductive workers, including workers with the highest rates of absence, we
expect a negative relation between absence and wages. However, the fact
that Dyrstad and Lysø (1998) on time series data also estimate negative
elasticities for LTA support the interpretation of dominating substitution
26If we include only the quarter dummies the estimate is -0.6.
27It is only the estimate of the OLS version of the STA equation which is statistically
larger than one. Imposing the restriction that this parameter equals one does not change
the other parameter estimates.
28This result is in line with the results obtained by Dyrstad and Lysø (1998), in the
sense that the direction of the diﬀerence between these wage elasticities in the STA and
LTA relations is the same. They estimate negative wage elasticities for LTA but positive
for STA. Their explanation to this is that it is more likely that income eﬀects dominate
for short absence spells than for long spells because the budget restriction is flatter in the
former cases.
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eﬀects.
Changes in overtime premia (wOjst) aﬀect STA significantly negative, which
again and consistently have to be interpreted as substitution eﬀects. The
corresponding elasticities for LTA are not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
According to the theoretical model we thus expect that more overtime will
reduce STA and not aﬀect LTA, but this is not the case. The estimated
eﬀects of more overtime work are significantly positive for both STA and
LTA, i.e., contrary to the theoretical predictions.
The estimated model is not a real test of the theoretical predictions of
overtime on absence because more overtime work may increase working pres-
sure so that sickness and absence among workers increase, c.f. our comments
to the model specification in the preceding section. Consequently, the pos-
itive estimates may be due to dominating pressure eﬀects. The estimated
eﬀect on LTA is larger than on STA, which give some support to this inter-
pretation. Because the adjustment period is longer for LTA than for STA,
the long run elasticities based on the OLS estimates underline such a diﬀer-
ence. If we assume that there is more serious sickness among those on long
term absence spells we would expect that the eﬀect on LTA is larger than
the eﬀect on STA.
Table 4 gives the estimates of the overtime equation, and it should be
noted that the diﬀerences between the OLS and IV estimates are small with
the exception of the parameter in front of LTA (hA4jst). Explanatory power
measured by R2 is slightly above 60 per cent and there is no indication of
serious first order serial correlation in the error terms. Also in Table 4 het-
eroskedastic consistent standard errors are used. Most of the year dummies
are not significantly diﬀerent from zero but there are significant seasonal
variations in overtime work. It should also be noted that the period of ad-
justment is longer for overtime work as compared to absence, implying larger
diﬀerences between short and long run eﬀects.
The gender eﬀect is estimated to approximately 0.4. This result is ac-
cording to the picture given in Table 1 of more overtime work among men
than among women. The estimated eﬀect of the employment variable (njst)
could be interpreted as a firm size eﬀect saying that larger firms use more
overtime work than smaller firms. However, the result could also be inter-
preted as a scale eﬀect, because if firms hire more workers in order to increase
production, this can be done by both increasing employment and overtime
work. This explanation is consistent with the theoretical model. The ar-
gument that more workers are hired at the cost of getting more ”marginal”
23
Table 3: Parameter Estimates - Absence
Short term absence Long term absenceExplanatory
Variables OLS IV OLS1990-1993
OLS
1993-1996 OLS IV
OLS
1990-1993
OLS
1993-1996
hTAisjt-1 0.229.93
0.21
6.82
0.23
7.85
0.23
7.65
0.38
19.22
0.37
13.67
0.41
14.98
0.35
14.09
wNjst -0.482.41
-0.54
1.59
-0.40
1.53
-0.76
2.73
-0.61
2.44
-0.70
1.76
-0.85
2.75
-0.50
1.30
wOjst -0.324.51
-0.33
3.50
-0.30
3.02
-0.35
3.65
0.03
0.32
0.04
0.31
0.16
1.47
-0.11
0.83
umst -0.030.65
-0.01
0.14
-0.13
1.78
0.10
1.57
-0.04
0.57
-0.01
0.12
-0.02
0.25
-0.03
0.39
hTOjst 0.043.43
0.06
2.33
0.04
2.76
0.04
2.58
0.05
3.82
0.09
2.84
0.04
2.43
0.06
3.02
njst 1.1430.08
1.12
15.90
1.12
22.35
1.14
21.90
1.08
25.98
1.05
14.26
1.02
18.24
1.15
20.07
Gender -0.132.86
-0.16
1.93
-0.06
0.80
-0.20
3.36
-0.51
7.71
-0.54
4.98
-0.50
5.27
-0.49
5.60
Y1990 -0.111.57
-0.13
2.02
0.02
0.24
__ -0.02
0.25
0.04
0.45
0.15
1.57
__
Y1991 -0.172.60
-0.17
3.09
-0.07
1.01
__ -0.02
0.23
-0.02
0.20
0.16
1.80
__
Y1992 -0.101.50
-0.10
2.01
0.01
0.21
__ -0.08
0.97
-0.08
1.26
0.09
1.07
__
Y1993 -0.121.69
-0.12
2.14
__ __ -0.18
2.01
-0.18
2.02
__ __
Y1994 -0.121.88
-0.13
2.44
__ 0.04
0.58
-0.21
2.34
-0.22
3.32
__ -0.01
0.12
Y1995 0.040.70
0.04
0.84
__ 0.22
2.89
-0.12
1.34
-0.12
1.62
__ 0.09
0.84
Y1996 __ __ __ 0.202.48
__ __ __ 0.21
2.01
Q2 -0.5410.49
-0.54
10.96
-0.73
10.22
-0.36
5.13
-0.32
4.52
-0.30
4.66
-0.29
3.17
-0.33
3.23
Q3 -0.5110.04
-0.52
9.77
-0.62
8.97
-0.41
5.72
-0.31
4.59
-0.32
5.23
-0.30
3.23
-0.37
3.77
Q4 0.051.09
0.05
0.88
-0.07
1.12
0.28
3.94
0.17
2.63
0.16
2.35
0.15
1.71
0.24
2.50
Constant 1.611.95
1.97
1.31
0.77
0.72
3.16
2.68
1.37
1.28
1.83
1.08
1.88
1.46
1.06
0.66
R2 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50
SEE 1.81 1.82 1.86 1.82 2.41 2.42 2.35 2.51
DW 2.01 __ 1.96 1.91 2.06 __ 1.98 1.98
Sargan __ 0.84 __ __ __ 0.32 __ __
Number of
observations 10665 10270 5925 5925 10665 10270 5925 5925
Notes: t-values based on robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients (White, 1980). R2 is
adjusted for degrees of freedom. The Durbin-Watson statistics (DW) are computed within individual
units (Bhargava, Franzini and Narendanantham, 1982). Sargan is the Sargan-Hansen test of the
overidentifying restrictions, where the p-values are reported (Sargan1988). SEE is standard error of
regression. Instruments used in the instrumental variables method (IV) are first differenced lagged values
and lagged levels of overtime.
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labour also implies more overtime work.
The estimated wage elasticities are in accordance with the theoretical
predictions: A higher normal wage rate increases overtime work whereas a
higher overtime premium has the opposite eﬀect. The estimated eﬀects are
unreasonably large and highly significant. Based on these estimates, the long
run elasticities w.r.t. normal wages and overtime premia are approximately
3.8 and -1.8, respectively. This means that if both the normal wage rate and
the overtime premium increase by one per cent overtime work increases by 2
per cent in the long run.
Unemployment aﬀects overtime work negatively, which to some extent
is according to the picture in Table 1. The estimated long run elasticity is
approximately -0.4, so if the rate of unemployment doubles, overtime work
is reduced by 40 per cent. As mentioned in connection to the discussion
of data in Section 3.1, there are at least two explanations to this inverse
relationship. First, high unemployment corresponds to low production, which
directly reduces demand for overtime work. Secondly, in periods with low
unemployment it is in general more diﬃcult to get workers, so that overtime
work has to be increased.
Short term absence does not aﬀect overtime significantly in the IV model,
whereas the OLS estimate is diﬀerent from zero at the 7 per cent level of
significance (one tail test). LTA has a statistically significant eﬀect in the
OLS model, and the estimate is much larger but not significant when the
IV estimator is applied. The IV estimate implies a long run elasticity of
0.19. In order to illustrate this eﬀect we can use overtime and absence data
from the ”average firm” in our dataset. This firm has about 2,200 overtime
hours and 370 days of long term absence per quarter. If long term absence
increases by one day, overtime hours increase by 1.4 hours in such a firm,
which sounds reasonable. As illustrated in Table 1 there have been large
changes in overtime work, both over time and between firms, and based on
our estimates absence changes may count for a large part of these changes.
As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, the absence and overtime relations
have also been estimated on the sub-periods 1990-93 and 1993-96. The first
period corresponds to the period of increasing unemployment, while the sec-
ond corresponds to decreasing unemployment, c.f. the discussion in relation
to Table 1. Most of the estimates are similar irrespective of estimation pe-
riod, but there are some important diﬀerences, particularly regarding STA:
Seasonal variation seems to be more important in the period of increasing
unemployment. The estimated parameters indicate that STA is considerably
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Table 4: Parameter estimates - Overtime
Overtime HoursExplanatory
Variables OLS IV OLS1990-1993
OLS
1993-1996
hTOisjt-1 0.6333.10
0.63
13.72
0.62
24.50
0.64
24.56
wNjst 1.395.30
1.44
2.95
1.69
4.44
1.23
3.85
wOjst -0.678.76
-0.68
3.94
-0.78
7.14
-0.61
6.20
umst -0.162.65
-0.15
2.04
-0.16
1.72
-0.20
3.24
hTA3jst 0.031.47
0.02
0.20
0.03
1.13
0.03
0.97
hTA4jst 0.032.40
0.07
1.74
0.04
2.10
0.03
1.36
njst 0.5011.24
0.46
3.75
0.53
8.97
0.50
8.46
Gender 0.366.14
0.38
3.40
0.42
4.65
0.33
4.46
Y1990 -0.080.93
-0.07
0.75
-0.05
0.55
__
Y1991 -0.131.75
-0.13
2.14
-0.08
0.96
__
Y1992 -0.030.45
-0.03
0.61
0.02
0.30
__
Y1993 -0.060.73
-0.05
0.84
__ __
Y1994 0.071.02
0.08
1.75
__ 0.03
0.32
Y1995 -0.040.53
-0.03
0.57
__ -0.09
0.98
Y1996 __ __ __ -0.050.56
Q2 0.274.16
0.28
3.20
0.33
3.46
0.17
2.04
Q3 0.233.72
0.23
2.75
0.36
4.05
0.12
1.43
Q4 0.375.99
0.37
4.53
0.46
5.22
0.27
3.18
Constant -4.534.42
-4.63
2.59
-5.72
3.85
-4.03
3.24
R2 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.65
SEE 2.15 2.15 2.21 2.12
DW 2.27 __ 2.11 2.23
Sargan __ 0.98 __ __
Number of
observations 10665 10270 5925 5925
Notes: See Table 3. Instruments used in the instrumental
variables method (IV) are first differenced lagged values
and lagged levels of both absence variables.26
lower during summer time than in the period of decreasing unemployment.
The unemployment elasticity is larger in absolute value and more significant
in the period 1990-93. In fact, the estimated unemployment elasticity in the
period 1993-96 is positive but not significantly diﬀerent from zero. The esti-
mated gender eﬀects imply that STA among women is higher during a period
where labour markets improve: Statistically there is no gender diﬀerence in
the period of increasing unemployment.
These results are reasonably interpreted in the context of discipline mech-
anisms. This interpretation is underlined if we look at the sub-sample esti-
mates for LTA and if we have in mind that it is reasonable to assume that
there is more serious sickness among those on long term absence spells than
among those on short term spells, and consequently that it is more diﬃcult
to discipline LTA. The sub-sample estimates of the LTA relations indicate
no diﬀerences w.r.t. unemployment and gender eﬀects, and the seasonal
diﬀerences are much smaller.
There are also some diﬀerences between the sub-sample estimates w.r.t.
the wage variables. However, it is diﬃcult to give plausible interpretations
to these diﬀerences, and they seem to be of minor importance.
Concerning the sub-sample estimates of the overtime relation, the two
most important diﬀerences are related to the wage and unemployment eﬀects.
The wage eﬀects are stronger in the period of increasing unemployment,
while changes in unemployment seem to be more important in the period of
decreasing unemployment. However, none of these diﬀerences are statistically
significant.
5 Concluding Remarks
The topic of this paper has been to analyse theoretically and empirically the
relationship between overtime work and absence. Theoretically the eﬀects on
absence of changes in demand for overtime hours depend on the reservation
wage for overtime work. If the actual rate of overtime pay is higher than the
reservation wage, more overtime work will reduce absence. In this case an
increase in the overtime premium will also reduce absence. If the actual rate
of overtime pay is less or equal to the reservation wage, changes in demand
for overtime work will not aﬀect absence. Concerning overtime work, the
theoretical prediction is unambiguously that more absence increases overtime
work.
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The empirical analyses confirm that more days of absence increase over-
time work, but it seems as long term absence is more important than short
term absence in this respect. The size of the eﬀects are plausible. Also the
theoretical prediction of a negative impact on absence of higher overtime
premia is confirmed empirically for short term absence. However, the esti-
mation results show that more overtime work increases both short and long
term absence, which is contrary to the theoretical prediction. This result is
reasonably interpreted as a pressure eﬀect, as overtime work may generate
pressure on workers and consequently more sickness absenteeism. The fact
that the eﬀect is larger for long term than for short term absence support
this explanation. The estimated relationships between overtime work and
absence are rather similar in the two sub-periods 1990-93 (increasing unem-
ployment) and 1993-96 (decreasing unemployment), so it seems as they do
not depend on conditions in the labour market.
Higher rates of unemployment reduce absence but statistical significance
depends on specification w.r.t. time dummies and estimation period. Most
of the specifications without time dummies give statistically significant esti-
mates of reasonable size. Contrary to the results in Dyrstad and Lysø (1998),
long term absence is more aﬀected than short term absence with these spec-
ifications. This relation between short and long term absence is in line with
the picture seen in Table 1 of this paper. However, when we estimate the re-
lation for short term absence on data from the sub-period 1990-93, including
both year and quarter dummies, we obtain a statistically significant estimate
which is close to the corresponding estimate in ibid.
More unemployment reduce overtime work, which could be explained
by production cuts in downturns and/or binding recruiting restrictions in
periods of low unemployment.
The estimated wage eﬀects in the absence relations are negative, and in
the context of our theoretical model they have to be explained by dominating
substitution eﬀects. Higher rates of overtime allowances reduce the amount
of overtime work, while higher normal wage rates increase such work. These
eﬀects are highly significant and according to expectations. However, the
size of the estimated elasticities is larger than we expected.
We estimate a positive relationship between absence and employment,
and between overtime work and employment. As the estimated elasticities
in the absence relations are larger than one, this indicate presence of compo-
sition eﬀects. However, positive estimates could simply be interpreted as firm
size eﬀects. The positive relationship between overtime hours and employ-
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ment could also be interpreted as firm size eﬀects, saying that larger firms
use more overtime work than smaller firms. Another explanation is that it
is due to scale eﬀects.
As noted above, the models are estimated separately on the sub-periods
of increasing (1990-93) and decreasing (1993-96) unemployment. The most
important diﬀerences are related to short term absence: The gender eﬀect
becomes less important and disappears statistically in the period of increasing
unemployment, while unemployment and seasonal variation become more
important.
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Appendix 1. Fixed Eﬀects Results
Explanatory
Variables
Short Term
Absece
Long Term
Absence
Explanatory
Variables Overtime
hTAisjt-1 0.000.04
0.17
7.89 h
O
jst-1
0.29
11.21
wNjst 0.060.11
-0.17
0.27 w
N
jst
-0.57
0.84
wOjst -0.090.60
-0.01
0.04 w
O
jst
-2.01
9.97
umst 0.000.05
-0.10
0.91 umst
0.07
0.64
hTOjst 0.021.23
-0.01
0.31 h
TA
3jst
0.02
0.83
hTA4jst 0.000.20
njst 1.7514.51
1.49
10.68 njst
1.05
9.70
Y1990 -0.101.34
0.03
0.27 Y1990
-0.48
4.94
Y1991 -0.172.38
0.00
0.05 Y1991
-0.47
5.69
Y1992 -0.111.57
-0.08
0.88 Y1992
-0.36
4.41
Y1993 -0.141.90
-0.23
2.44 Y1993
-0.42
4.82
Y1994 -0.121.81
-0.25
2.93 Y1994
-0.11
1.58
Y1995 0.050.77
-0.16
1.98 Y1995
-0.16
2.21
Q2 -0.5411.20
-0.34
4.99 Q2
0.19
3.20
Q3 -0.6413.60
-0.40
6.15 Q3
0.14
2.59
Q4 -0.061.20
0.08
1.21 Q4
0.39
6.72
R2 0.62 0.56 R2 0.72
SEE 1.67 2.26 SEE 1.91
DW 1.96 1.96 DW 1.96
N of obs 10665 10665 N of obs 10665
Notes: See Table 3.
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